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Abstract: This paper introduces a framework for the analysis of the
barriers, costs and constraints microloan customers in the United
States encounter. While much previous work has been done on the
benefits and potential of microenterprise in the United States as well
as the program costs, relatively little research has explored the process
from the perspective of the customer. This paper first introduces the
gap between loan fund capital and loan disbursement. It then posits a
framework for understanding the customer perspective. Further
research is recommended to determine which factors are salient and
how they can be applied to benefit microloan customers and microlenders in the United States context.

In the past twenty years, microenterprise development tried to
alleviate poverty in the United States. Initially, practitioners
and policy makers presumed that the lack of access to capital
was the primary impediment for the self-employed to start and
sustain their businesses. Because financial institutions are riskadverse to borrowers with weak credit histories, insufficient
collateral, and limited or no business experience, alternative
vehicles to credit were required. So microloan funds proliferated in the 1980s and 90s to serve this market. But the experience of practitioners today indicates that lack of demand and
not supply is the principal challenge facing the field. There are
simply too many dollars and too few customers. In attempting
to understand this dynamic, few have researched the costs, barriers, and constraints for potential borrowers participating in
these programs well.
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The premise of this article is that the full range of costs of
microborrowing are seriously underestimated. Included in
these costs is a program design that in itself creates potential
barriers to access. When they identify these barriers and understand their costs, practitioners can develop lower-cost, highervolume and -impact models for the delivery of credit and
training.
This paper suggests a framework for the range of costs
incurred by individual customers of microloan 1 programs in
the United States and the barriers and constraints to borrowing. The first objective is to identify the primary drivers of
microenterprise borrowing. The second is to propose a framework for further research and analysis. These findings include
implications for both policy makers and practitioners.

Barriers to Borrowing and Consumption Costs
Understanding the barriers to borrowing, constraints, and
costs in microloan programs is necessary to fully understand
the microenterprise development industry in the United
States. The bulk of the research completed to date has analyzed
program design, delivery, and outputs. Substantial research
regarding impact is underway, primarily under the auspices of
the Aspen Institute’s FIELD program. Recently, some research
addressing transaction costs and subsidies to program costs has
begun to emerge. However, little work has been done on consumption costs and their implications for microlending. We
need a thorough understanding of both the benefits and costs
in order to judge the efficacy of United States microlending.
When microloans were introduced in the United States,
the primary emphasis was on providing small amounts of
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capital to microentrepreneurs who could not borrow from
mainstream financial institutions. Over the years, the field was
successful in obtaining capital from the U.S. Small Business
Administration (and later the Community Development
Institutions Fund), national and local foundations, and state
and local government. Of the 159 microloan funds with sufficient data available for tabulation in the 1999 Directory of U.S.
Microenterprise Programs (Langer, Orwick, & Kays, 1999), the
total loan pool capital adds to $117,138,269. There is no information on outstanding loans, but total cumulative lending is
$130,492,113 from the beginning of microloans, with
$91,782,828 in loans from the top 20 percent of lending programs. In 74 of the 159 programs, the loan pool is greater than
the cumulative lending, with a minimum of approximately $32
million in available idle funds. Given typical loan terms of
three months to three years, and the age of the program, this
indicates that supply of microloan capital greatly exceeds
demand. A recent survey of more than 30 loan programs in
California showed that over 50% of the capital was not loaned
out and that seven loans per year was typical (Bhatt, Painter, &
Tang, 1999).
This surplus of capital among almost half of the programs
can be attributed to a number of possible causes due to factors
either on the supply side or the demand side. One supply factor is that the rapid increase of funding availability has outpaced the capacity of programs to attract more microloan
customers. Many programs began to receive large capital infusions in the 1990s. Also, many programs were new in 1997, the
most recent reporting year of the survey. Another possible
explanation is incomplete or insufficient information flows to
target populations. Demand-side factors include lack of
demand for capital and lack of viable microloan customers.
Among all of the possible causes for lack of scale in
microlending, this analysis explores the cost of consumption of
microloans in the United States, the barriers to access, and the
constraints on microentrepreneurs. While these factors undelie
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the concerns of information flows, demand, and qualifications,
they transcend these simple explanations and uncover a complex and diverse set of issues that have a profound effect on the
ability of microloan programs to serve the poor.
There are a variety of costs associated with borrowing
from a microloan program in the United States. The cost to the
customer is not simply the interest rate plus fees, although that
is the most explicit portion of the costs. Microloan costs
include financial costs, transaction costs, and psychosocial
costs. In addition, systematic barriers and constraints could
also have an impact on the microentrepreneur’s desire and ability to obtain a microloan. These barriers include discrimination, regulations and laws, and information gaps. A summary
of these cost factors, barriers, and constraints is included in
Table 1.
The borrower’s cost to obtain a loan, or the perceived
price of the loan, is the sum of the transaction costs plus the
financial costs. It is possible that consumption costs 2 of
microloans are so high that microentrepreneurs cannot afford
them, even though they would qualify for them. The analysis
that follows includes a discussion of the categories of costs for
microloan customers as well as the barriers to borrowing.

Theories of Consumption
and Their Relevance to Microenterprise
Any discussion of the consumption of goods or services and
the costs of the process of consuming them is grounded in economic theories of consumption and consumer behavior. In this
case, we turn briefly to consumption in general and the consumption of social welfare goods and services.
Microloan customers in the United States are individual
consumers of microloan products. They have a choice,
although constrained, whether or not they choose to obtain a
microloan. In economic terms, the decision to borrow is either
based on maximizing or satisfying utility. Because entrepreneurship can easily be understood as the customer’s best
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avaiable option (Servon, 1999), I am assuming satisfying behavior. Therefore, we can expect microloan customers to borrow
at the level that satisfies their needs to the best of their ability.
So the expected utility of the microloan must exceed its cost.
Although we are not performing a complete cost-benefit
study, we can observe that when microentrepreneurs borrow
from microlenders, they receive a “bundled good,” much as
homeowners buy not only a home (shelter) but the features,
benefits and amenities associated with that home. In the case of
a microloan, the bundle may consist of the products or services
acquired with the proceeds, the value of training and technical
assistance, pride of ownership, the power of self-determination, and anticipated earnings.
It is the consumption costs of services for social welfare
that are at the core of the analysis that follows. While
microloans are not public goods and are generally not offered
by government entities, they act like government-provided
goods and services in many ways and carry their characteristics:
• Microloans can support social welfare objectives. Microloans
are available to the “disadvantaged” entrepreneurs who are
either on the margins or are disconnected from the mainstream.
• They are available through third-sector and public-sector
organizations, albeit often with private-sector support.
• They are priced at an interest rate well below “cost” and are
offered for unbankable customers.
The consumption costs of such goods are not particularly
well understood but are typically regressive and include participation costs (Warren & Weschler, 1986). Services may not be
consumable as available or may be too costly, thereby pricing
people out of consumption when they do not have the
resources to be. These costs include such factors as time, effort, money, and psychological and physical burdens. In
essence, goods are effectively rationed via these consumption
costs. This framework applies directly to microlenders and
entrepreneurs.
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* Predominant burden

U= up-front costs

D=distributed over time

Lack of Collateral (U) (DD)

** DD=demand side, SS=supply side

Lack of Business Knowledge (D) (DD)

Buffer Funds/Mandatory Savings (U)

Transportation(D)

Learning Factors (U) (DD)

Insufficient Social Capital (U) (DD)

Group Loan Payments (D)

Group Loan Costs (D)

Service Charges (D)

Geographic Constraints (U) (DD/SS)

Credit History (U) (DD)

United States (U) (DD)

Lack of Documentation of Legal Standing in the

Information Gaps (U) (DD)

Regulatory and Legal Constraints (U) (DD)

Discrimination-race, gender, class (U) (DD)

Barriers/Constraints**

Lack of Trust and Fear of Formal Institutions (D) (DD)

Lost Wages (U)

Interest (D)

Frustration (D)

Stigma (D)

Risk Aversion (U)

Loss of Privacy (U)

Psychosocial Costs

Taxes & compliance (D)

Equity Required (U)
Loss of Means-Tested Benefits (U)

Late Fees & Penalties (D)

Pledged Collateral (U)

Technical Assistance Fees (U)
Child Care (U)

Technical Assistance Time (U)
Travel Time (U)

Closing Costs (U)

Training Time (U)

Application Fees (U)
Training Fees (U)

Transaction Costs

Financial Costs

Table 1. Cost Factors and Barriers and Constraints for Microloan Customers in the United States*
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Categories of Costs to Microloan Customers
The costs of microloans for United States customers are not
routinely calculated by programs or researchers. However,
when an estimate of customer costs is made, it usually includes
the cost of capital and, perhaps, any loan fees and charges.
While these two direct costs may capture a portion of the total
financial costs to the microloan customer, there are additional
implicit financial costs that borrowers must bear, oftentimes
regardless of whether they ultimately receive capital. Among
these financial costs are (1) fees for required training and technical assistance; (2) transportation; (3) childcare; and (4) membership charges. In addition, transaction costs associated with
the direct requirements of microloan programs add to borrower costs. A final category of additional costs is that of psychological and social costs, such as stigma associated with
the inability to borrow from banks and the need to obtain
cosigners.

Financial Costs
The financial costs of microloans vary considerably from program to program and are not necessarily directly proportional
to the amount borrowed or to the financial capacity of the
microloan customer. If anything, these financial costs are
regressive, creating the greatest burden on those least able to
pay. Many programs require extensive training for first-time
business owners, which, although generally free of charge, does
include other financial costs. Entrepreneurs with little or no
collateral and equity, and poor credit histories, and start-up
enterprises are more likely to need the services of a microlender and be subject to training and technical assistance requirements. They may also have to compensate for poor credit
histories with cosigners and have to participate in credit counseling and repair. Many of these costs are incurred up front,
before the customer obtains any microloan benefits. The financial burden of these requirements can be considerable.
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a. Interest rates—Microloan programs charge a wide range
of rates; the average rates reported in the 1999 Directory of
U.S. Microenterprise Programs (Langer, Orwick, & Kays,
1999) ranged from about 10% to 18%. These rates are higher
than those of commercial loans but lower than most credit
cards, particularly subprime cards. These are the most explicit
financial costs for loan customers and are ongoing costs.
b. Application fees—Microloan programs may charge application, commitment, and closing fees. Application fees may be
nonrefundable and may be charged up front.
c. Service charges—Some microloan programs charge a
monthly or per loan service charge. Until recently, one program charged a 4% fee on each loan. For a customer with a few
months’ loan, the effective rate was far in excess of the nominal rate.
d. Late fees and other penalties—With loan delinquency rates
ranging from 10% to 60% in microloan portfolios (Edgcomb,
Klein, & Clark, 1996), it is apparent that there are both late
fees and bounced-check charges on microloans. These are particularly burdensome for those living in poverty or on the margins of poverty, for which a $25 late charge may be a large part
of their income.
e. Closing costs—Out-of-pocket costs incurred by microlenders to secure mortgages and liens plus any legal costs. These
costs will vary considerably and are expected to be higher for
larger-dollar loans. They may range from zero to several hundred dollars and are generally up-front costs.
f. Training fees—When entrepreneurs are required to attend
training classes in order to qualify for loans, they may have
either class fees or materials fees for these trainings. The range
of costs may be from zero to a few hundred dollars. Within a
given loan program, they may be essentially fixed or have a
step function, depending on loan amount, but they are usually
incurred up front.
g. Technical assistance—While most microloan programs do
not charge for technical assistance, some do (Langer, Orwick,
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& Kays, 1999). They may have hourly rates, sometimes on a
sliding scale. Also, some entrepreneurs may pay brokers or
consultants to assist in the preparation of business plans or
loan applications. Most of these costs would be up front, with
potential continuing costs for ongoing assistance.
h. Transportation—Microloan customers must incur transportation costs in order to attend training sessions or meet
with business counselors, loan officers, or peer groups.
Depending upon proximity and transit options, these costs
may vary considerably. In addition, programs that require
more training classes or counseling sessions result in higher
transportation costs for customers. Transportation costs may
be heavily front-end loaded for training and technical assistance, but they may continue after the loan is received in a peer
group setting or when payments are made in person.
i. Childcare—Many microloan customers are single mothers
who must find childcare for their children when they attend
classes, meetings, and events. For those with the weakest social
networks and family linkages, this burden is likely to be
greater than others.
j. Taxes and costs of compliance—When microloan customers
must move from the informal economy to the formal economy
in order to access microloan dollars, they incur additional
financial costs. For example, reporting microenterprise income
on income taxes can increase the tax burden.
Taken together, these financial costs can be quite substantial, particularly for a low-income microloan customer.
Whether we assume that customers have complete or incomplete knowledge of the costs and are consumption maximizers,
a number of potential costs become clear, some of which are
known, others of which are less obvious and they can be high
relative to the size of loan.

Transaction Costs
Beyond the direct financial costs are a number of transaction
costs associated with microloans. Transaction costs in
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microloans can be understood as nonfinancial costs incurred
during the lending process from its beginning until its end.
Microloan customers encounter a range of costs associated
with the time spent in obtaining a microloan and subsequent
time spent on programs and events associated with the
microloan. The customer might otherwise have been engaged
in other more rewarding activities, including but not limited to
wage employment, self-employment income generation, and
other opportunities. One could argue that the time spent in
microenterprise development and training might be better
spent in adult, vocational, or post-secondary education.
a. Training time—Because programs require between zero
and ninety hours of training, they reflect a broad cost range.
No analysis has determined the direct benefit of microenterprise training, nor has one established the optimal type and
quantity of training to deliver. In any case, training brings
with it both potential benefits and clear opportunity costs.
b. Technical assistance time—Requirements appear more
flexible, the borrower having greater control over the amount
of time spent and the location of the assistance. Their opportunity is cost associated with technical assistance, and most of
the burden is up front, with potential future benefits.
c. Travel time—In addition to the financial cost of travel,
there is the opportunity cost. For those in rural areas, travel
time may be particularly burdensome. Programs requiring frequent or multiple meetings and training classes add to this
opportunity cost.
d. Lost wages—For some microloan customers who are
“patching” self-employment earnings with waged-employment
earnings, meetings or training sessions held during their working hours may result in lost wages. For those who are unemployed or who participate during nonworking hours, costs
may be counted in lost opportunities.
e. Pledged collateral—Requirements to pledge collateral
impose an opportunity cost by tying up the resources so that
they cannot be used for another purpose.
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f. Equity contribution requirements—When microloan programs require up-front equity contributions, they may deplete
the savings of a borrower. Such equity contributions may be
required to demonstrate that the borrower has exhibited “good
faith” and has made an investment in his or her business and
has something of value at risk.
g. Social-welfare policy costs—For microentrepreneurs
receiving means-tested benefits, there can be costs associated
with social-welfare policies. Under a range of programs,
including Job Opportunity and Basic Skills Training (JOBS)
and the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) (P.L. 97–300),
self-employment is either not an option or can result in the
loss of benefits (Raheim, 1997). In fact, for certain people who
receive income support, self-employment may result in worsened financial circumstances rather than improved ones
(Raheim, 1997).

Psychosocial Costs
In addition to the direct financial costs and the opportunity
costs that a microloan customer may encounter, certain social
and psychological burdens and costs may be associated with
borrowing from a microlender. While there are inherent challenges in determining dollar values, it is critical that these factors be recognized for their potential to prevent borrowing.
a. Stigma—The stigma effects of borrowing from a
microlender rather than a bank have not yet been documented.
Microloan programs are often known only to a small group of
people within a community and serve as the “lender of last
resort.” Microloan customers may be required to provide cosigners in order to receive their loans. A microloan borrower
essentially acknowledges an inability to access credit by borrowing from a microlender.
b. Frustration—The process of becoming a microloan customer is generally neither seamless nor rapid. Numerous steps
and processes are involved, even in the quickest and least
restrictive cases. In particular, having to attend numerous
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training classes and to respond to multiple requests for
information during the application process can be perceived as
bothersome. Even if the training is helpful and the customer
understands the need for the information, the time and effort
required, not to mention the financial costs, can be a source of
frustration.
c. Concerns about privacy—Related to the previous issues is
the issue of privacy. Potential microloan customers must generally share considerable personal data in order to obtain small
amounts of credit. They may not want to share their information with virtual strangers. Because of negative experiences
with institutional actors, they may shy away from providing
personal information. In addition, borrowers may be concerned about revealing immigration information or formalizing illegal or informal activities.
d. Risk aversion—While concerns about risk are anticipated
in any entrepreneurial transaction, the risks of failure for
microloan customers may be more profound than for those in
the mainstream. For a microloan customer who has very limited assets, the risk of losing those assets is disproportionately
large. The risk of being unable to repay the loan out of the
income from the entrepreneurial enterprise can also be problematic; required repayment terms could outstrip the ability to
repay out of earned income should the business fail. All these
issues reflect potential challenges for microloan customers.
The self-employed poor must have support networks of
families and friends to assist them with these risks (Schreiner,
1999). During crises, it is family and friends that offer insurance in the forms of cash and in-kind (Bates & Servon, 1996).
However, this is particularly problematic for those most disconnected from the mainstream. “Microlending will not help
those who rely heavily on a societal safety net,” says Richard
Taub. “It is most likely to help those who already have at least
one moderately secure income” (Taub, 1998).
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Systematic Barriers and Constraints
There is also a range of systematic barriers and constraints that
has an impact both on the microentrepreneur’s ability to and
interest in obtaining a microloan. These barriers include discrimination, regulatory and legal factors, and information
gaps, to name a few. In addition, there are trust, social capital,
and business constraints.

Discrimination
Much has been written on discrimination in general and relative to discrimination in small business credit markets.
Blanchflower, Levine, and Zimmerman used data from the
1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances to determine
that constraints on credit for minority-owned firms are greater
than those faced by white-owned firms, including more frequent denial of applications and higher interest rates (1998).
Also, research indicates that black-owned firms experience particularly large capital constraints (Bates, 1997). Concerns
about being turned down may prevent black-owned firms from
being formed or applying for loans (Blanchflower, Levine, &
Zimmerman, 1998).
Regulatory and Legal Constraints
As has been widely reported, microloans work particularly
well in places where the majority of the adults are selfemployed and where the barriers to self-employment are very
low. Neither of these factors is prevalent in the United States.
The complexity of owning and operating a business, including
the multitude of regulatory and legal constraints, is formidable. While microentrepreneurs may operate in the informal
economy without regard for these legal and regulatory factors,
microloan programs may require compliance.
a. Licenses and regulation—Programs may require that businesses obtain appropriate licenses and comply with industry
regulations, thereby creating a financial burden by reducing
revenues and increasing taxes. For example, a child care
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provider may have more children in her care while unlicensed
than when she is licensed. At a weekly rate of $60, it could
mean a loss of $3,120 per year in revenues alone in order to
obtain a small amount of capital, if the number of children
must decrease by one.
Regulations and laws also increase the level of complexity
of transactions and the borrowing process. A microloan in the
United States may entail multiple legal documents and additional legal costs. Microentrepreneurs must also understand the
regulations regarding their specific business and take measures
to comply. Zoning laws and child labor laws may prevent
microbusinesses from operating out of a home and may keep
children from helping out (Schreiner, 2000). Both taxes and
compliance with regulations have noncash costs that make it
expensive to operate in the “’formal” sector in the United
States. In fact, Schreiner states, “Taxes and compliance have
invisible transaction and opportunity costs that may swamp
their visible cash costs, and their quasi-fixed nature impinges
regressively on small firms” (2000, p. 17). Either compliance or
noncompliance is a dangerous position for a fragile enterprise.
Also, three of the most common types of enterprises run by
women (food service, beauty salons, and child care) require
licenses in the United States, thus increasing the cost of entry
(Schreiner & Morduch, 2000).
b. Operational complexities— United States microloan customers encounter operational complexities that do not pertain to their counterparts in the third world. They must be
good at far more than producing a product. Schreiner (2000,
p. 13) explains, “They not only provide the service or make
the good that earns revenues, but they also pay taxes, comply
with regulations, supervise employees, maintain a locale,
attract customers, and find suppliers. Entrepreneurs must wear
many hats, and some of them may not fit well.”
c. Documentation—An additional microloan barrier can be
the lack of documentation of legal standing in the United
States as required by some microlenders.
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Economic Factors
A range of economic factors affect microloan customers.
Economists have looked at consumption and liquidity from an
entrepreneurial perspective for a number of years (Evans &
Jovanovic, 1989; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, & Rosen, 1994).
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) provided a model of entrepreneurial choice under liquidity constraints using data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men. They explain
that the liquidity constraint has two ways of reducing the flow
of capital to entrepreneurship: by preventing some people
from trying entrepreneurship (1.3% of the population) and
through the ones who do try entrepreneurship using less capital because of the constraint. Some economists argue that lack
of access to loans is not a constraint (Cressy, 2000; Xu, 1998).
The reason loans can be a constraint is because they require
collateral, which, in turn, requires savings. If loans matter at
the margin, it is only if and when skills and savings are present
(Schreiner, 2000). Berger and Udell indicate that debt is constrained by wealth (1998).
a. Limited or poor credit history—Microentrepreneurs may
have a disadvantage when searching for business loans because
they either have no credit or poor credit. Those with good
credit may have access to commercial bank loans or credit
cards to finance their businesses. As Schreiner and Morduch
note, “In the Third World, the task of microfinance is to judge
the risk of self-employed borrowers new to formal credit; in
the United States, the task is often to judge the risk of selfemployed borrowers with bad credit records” (2000, p. 11).
For example, in Himes and Servon’s (1998) study, 25 percent of
the clients had bad credit records.
b. Relative opportunity to access other resources (credit cards,
loan sharks, title lenders)—This is not a barrier or constraint for
microloan customers; rather it is a concern for the microlender. While there may be a conception that microloans are the
only financing option for microloan customers, there may be
alternatives, such as credit cards, loan sharks, and title lenders.
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Bhatt (1997) asserts that the operational policies of some
microenterprise programs may have driven potential customers to seek other sources of financing, perhaps increasing
economic
inequities
rather
than
reducing
them.
Microentrepreneurs in the United States may be able to access
capital from sources other than microlenders. In one study, a
quarter of the ACCION borrowers either had defaults or
bankruptcies, and over half used microloans to consolidate
other debt (Himes & Servon, 1998). In addition, another study
reports that the bulk of the demand for microloans is probably
met via credit cards (Bates & Servon, 1996). The situation is
summarized as follows: “Although credit-card debt is high
priced, it has low transaction costs and very low total costs.
Likewise, loans from the so-called fringe banks—pawn shops,
check cashing outlets, and rent-to-own stores—have high prices
but low total cost.... Competition has pushed other financial
intermediaries closer to the poor” (Schreiner, 2000).
c. Lack of collateral—Another barrier for microloan customers is their lack of collateral to offer in support of their
loan. This is a demand-side constraint.

Information Asymmetries
A variety of information gaps may explain customer issues
with access to capital. These may be either demand-side or supply-side issues.
a. Lack of business knowledge and skills—This demand-side
barrier to self-employment and business capitalization is
vitally important to microentrepreneurs. Business knowledge
and business skills, such as finance, marketing, and previous
employment, have been associated with the ability to start and
operate a profitable business (Brush, 1990). This deficiency
may cause entrepreneurs to have businesses that do not support themselves and their families (Raheim, 1997). Bates notes,
“No serious studies have demonstrated that small amounts of
debt can overcome human-capital deficiencies that otherwise
minimize chances for business success” (Bates, 1997).
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b. Lack of knowledge about resource—Microloan programs
anecdotally indicate that the “build it and they will come” concept has not worked for them. Clearly, the numbers of entrepreneurs who have borrowed is less than anticipated, as
demonstrated by the failure to take up loan-pool capital. If
entrepreneurs do not know about microloan programs, they
cannot borrow from them. Thus, lack of information can be
problematic, as can inaccurate or incomplete information. This
lack of information or presence of inaccurate or incomplete
information may be caused by the inability of microlenders to
market their services effectively. Or it may be the result of
rationing behavior on the part of microlenders.
c. Geographic constraints—These constraints come in a
number of forms, ranging from issues of proximity of training
and loan fund meeting locations to issues of personal safety and
comfort in going to meeting places. This is a particular problem in rural areas where there may be both transportationaccess issues and considerable distances to travel. Such
constraints may be problematic for customers and lenders.
d. Learning factors (style and basic literacy, financial
literacy)—Entrepreneurs do not all have precisely the same
style of learning or needs for information. They may have a
wide range of levels of basic literacy. If basic literacy is weak,
entrepreneurial training may then also be weak. Furthermore,
financial literacy skills, not just business record keeping, may
need to be taught.

Other Factors
In addition to the extensive list of barriers and constraints
above, other factors also may add to the burden of microloan
customers. These include lack of trust and shortages of social
capital.
a. Lack of trust—Microloan customers may come to
microlending programs with a built-in fear of formal institutions, including banks and governments. While microlenders
may not be as formal as these other entities, they do have an
institutional presence and can be threatening. The literature on
Volume 4 Number 1

131

Journal of Microfinance

the unbanked includes discussions of the horrendous experiences poor people have had with mainstream banks (Beverly,
Tescher, & Marzahl, 2001). These experiences have made people hesitant to enter into a relationship with a financial entity
of any kind.
b. Social networks/social capital—Microloan customers are
often single, minority mothers who do not have strong social
networks and family support. The absence of social capital is
projected to increase transaction costs.
In addition to the above analysis of entrepreneurs in general, it is noteworthy that when this issue is viewed through
the combined lenses of gender stratification and small business
analysis, additional barriers emerge. Loscocco and Robinson
suggest that gender segregation, skill deficits, lack of access to
capital and government contracts, and family responsibilities
apply to women entrepreneurs (1991). With the combination
of race and gender, there may be additional consumption costs
because of the simultaneous operation of these factors.

Conclusion
The framework described above is drawn from the literature
on microenterprise development. It paints a picture of a complex and diverse landscape of barriers, costs, and constraints
for United States microloan customers. With additional
research, this theoretical framework can be tested and modified. An analytical model and tool can be developed to assist
programs in understanding the costs, for their customers.
From a program and policy perspective, barriers, costs and
constraints that do not bear on risk of microloan default can be
minimized or eliminated. After further consideration, this
framework may open up opportunities to increase microlending in the United States.
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Notes
1. A microloan is defined as a loan of $25,000 or less for the owners of a business with five employees or less.
2. In the context of this paper, consumption costs are the costs of the
consumer to acquire and usefully utilize a microloan. Some of these costs are
readily quantifiable, while others are not. If consumption costs are too high,
potential and entitled consumers may be priced out of the market for
microloans.
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